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Abstract 
This study was conducted to examine the role of institutions on tax buoyancy in a set of developing nations. The 
analysis of 50 nations from the time period 1996-2013 indicates that mostly institutional factors such as bureaucratic 
efficiency, rule of law, corruption are affecting negatively to the tax collection in these regions. Revenue from 
indirect taxes is more sensitive to these non-economic factors in a society. Moreover, the study suggests that nature of 
relationship between tax buoyancy and institutional characteristics of the system is sensitive to different categories of 
political regimes i.e. Democracy and Autocracy. Results showed that democracy is affecting positively to the tax 
collection while autocracy is having negative impact in each case i.e. direct, indirect or total tax revenues. But in 
autocratic regimes, proportion of indirect and direct taxes in total revenue is more than in case of democracy. 
Findings help to suggest that efforts should be made to democratize the political system mostly in developing world 
so that more and more tax revenue generation could be made possible.  
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1: Introduction  
Tax Bouyancy is a term used to measure and show the rate of responsiveness of taxes due to 
increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of any nation i.e. how much tax revenues and 
collection is increasing due to increase in national income a nation. If the responsive rate is 
positive then tax system is said to be buoyant and efficient. Unfortunately developing countries 
are lacking this tax buoyancy in their tax systems due to less know how about tax culture. 
Reluctance and avoidance is also due to institutional structures of these developing economies. 
Hence it has been observed now that such low level of tax collection is not mainly due to lesser 
level of incomes rather its mainly because of many institutional hindrances which create 
blockade into the economic system. This is the reason that now a days Institutions are on the 
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forefront of economic analysis. Therefore this study attempts to evaluate tax buoyancy not 
relative to GDP growth but with respect to institutional features i.e. how much these are 
facilitating tax collection in those nations which suffers from poor performance of their 
institutional set ups. A lot of literature examines the relation between particular institutions and 
growth. Eventually, it can be concluded that the importance of institutions is well acknowledged 
and being studied persistently in everyday economics within the framework of New Institutional 
Economics. On the other side,  Romer (1986) “Endogenous Growth Model” has established that 
by reducing fiscal imbalance, growth can be achieved. It can be achieved either by increasing 
tax revenue or lowering expenditure.  
Most developing countries want to be globalized so that they can integrate with international 
economy. However, they have to face extensive challenges in this recognition among which the 
most burning issue is to raise tax revenue. For increasing real GDP growth rates and per capita 
income, Taxation is one of the most flexible ways. It is also used to shift resources from private 
to public use and is considered most efficient domestic tool for the government to meet the 
social, political and economic goals. Moreover tax revenue can be used for various purposes 
such as to assign the power to the government for resource allocation, to stabilize the economy, 
to define market places, for provision of social development and optimal economic growth. 
Over the past several decades, the fiscal deficit has been a very crucial issue in most developing 
countries. The reason of this imbalance remained low tax revenue collection and excess increase 
in current expenditures by their governments. Such excess expenditures can be controlled if 
there is a proper check and balance in the system. And this check and balance comes through 
proper institutional infrastructure which could make accountable everyone for their deeds. But 
unfortunately developing nations are prey to their ‘poor institutional trap’ which is not letting 
them to remove such barriers to economic growth. Size of informal sector is a major attribute of 
developing nations in this regard. Reliance on this sector reduces the dependence on definite 
modern taxes like individual income tax or at whole sale level value added taxes. Informal 
activities contribute large share to production but they consist very small profit. However strong 
Tax administration may bring down tax evading entities.  
Numerous studies have put a glance on institutions as determinants of revenue. Ghura (1998) 
found that corruption and structural reforms affect tax ratio. A rise in corruption is link with low 
tax revenue. For instance, Bird et al. (2004) investigate the revenue performance determinants 
are regulations, rule of law and corruption. Literature largely investigates the relationship 
between public policy and democracy. Democratization may influence the need of electorate 
through high taxes and higher spending (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Democratization is 
positively related to the tax revenue as well indirect taxes (Boix, 2003; Kenny & Winer, 2006). 
Degree of political stability and corruption are important determinants of tax revenue (Bire et 
al., 2008; Gupta, 2007). Gupta (2007) found that the important factors which cause variation in 
resource mobilization of developing countries are tax revenue i.e. direct tax, indirect tax, 
economic as well political stability and law and order. According to report of IMF (1988) 
effective tax administration depends on some factors such as; a predominant money economy, a 
high literacy rate to provide better options for policy makers, Reliable accounting , a political 
system which is not dominated by wealthy people.  Political factors are salso major hinders in 
tax policy of many countries. Successful reforms programmers suggest that a strong political 
will and commitment from leaders at government level is essential for tax system.  
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Hence it is evident from all this discussion that both taxes and institutions have a key role in any 
economic system. Therefore it is essential to estimate institutional determinants of tax buoyancy 
for those nations which are facing these institutional lapses in their economies and that’s why 
suffering from lower tax revenues. This study aims not to find the relationship between 
institutional structure and tax buoyancy in these nations only rather it also intends to analyse 
this relationship between tax collection and institutional structures political regime wise i.e. 
Democracy and Autocracy. 
1.1: Hypotheses: 
H1: Tax collection is sensitive to the political regimes and their institutional features. 
H2: Tax system of developing nations is regressive in nature. 
 
2: Literature Review 
Numerous researches have been conducted to study the impact of institutions on tax buoyancy. 
Friedman et al. (2000) established a relationship between institutions and unofficial economy 
in different countries such as OECD, Latin America, formally Communist Countries of Eastern 
Europe and the FSU. Results indicated that poor institutions are a cause to destabilize the tax 
base into the unofficial economy. Tax revenue as a percentage of totals GDP reduces because 
entrepreneur goes under ground to lessen the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. It was 
concluded that comparatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates while, corrupt 
governments eventually becomes small governments.  
Eltony (2002) also examined the determinants of tax efforts in 16 Arab countries for the period 
1994-2000 by using pooled time series and cross sectional country data. Findings showed that 
main determinants of tax revenue share of GDP were share of mining in GDP, share of 
agriculture in GDP and per capita income. Additionally, share of imports, exports and 
outstanding foreign debt were other variables which were considered to be very important 
determinants. But when country specific factors were being added such as government attitude, 
quality of tax administration, political system and other government institutes appear important 
determinants of tax share as well.  
Upender (2008) found that the gross tax buoyancy estimate was above unity during pre-tax 
reform period which showed that during pre-tax reform period, ratio to gross tax revenue to 
GDP was increasing along with an increase in GDP. While, the condition was reverse during 
post tax reforms. Additionally, it was less then unity during post tax reforms.  
Bird et al. (2008) emphasized that in developing and developed nations, State is an essential 
factor for satisfactory level of tax efforts. Level of taxes can be enhanced by improving voice 
and accountability and control of corruption. Estimated results suggested that by means of 
improved institutions, high income countries can improve their tax performance.  
Chaudhry and Munir (2010) empirically examined the determinants of low tax revenue in 
Pakistan. Empirical findings suggested that narrow tax base, low level of literacy, foreign aid, 
heavy dependence on agriculture sector and narrow tax base were determinants of low tax 
revenue. Additionally, broad money, trade openness and political stability were significant 
determinants of tax efforts in Pakistan.  
Attiya and Umaima (2012) indicated that institutional factors such as bureaucratic quality, law 
and order and control of corruption had a significant and positive impact on tax revenue. In the 
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same way, Garikai (2009), Qazi and Sulaiman (2010), Bonga (2009) empirically examined the 
determinants of tax buoyancy. Results suggested that tax buoyancy is negatively associated with 
monetization and other variables such as growth in agriculture and industrial sector, growth of 
fiscal deficit, growth of total expenditure and external aid growth can affect tax buoyancy in 
developing countries.  
Profeta et al. (2013) recently investigated the relationship between tax revenue and political 
variables. They used socio-economic, political and fiscal variables as potential determinants of 
democracy. Others crucial variables were protection of civil liberty and political strength of 
democratic institutions. Empirical finding suggest significant correlation between taxes and 
political variables. According to country’s fixed effect results, there was no significant 
relationship between taxes and democratic institutions.  
Flachaire et al. (2013) also examined that political institutions are the main determinants of 
growth and economic institutions and other variables affect growth in context of institutions. 
Their results shed light on how in autocratic regimes, economic performance is highly sensitive 
to policy choices. Political institutions play a vital role to determine growth rates indirectly 
while, economic institutions are direct determinants of growth. Keeping in view all these past 
findings, now this study attempts to analyze the importance of not only quality of institutions 
rather incorporating the effect of various political systems in the revenue generation process of 
developing nations. 
4: Methodology 
4.1: Methodology  
The general functional form of the model used in the study is as follows,  
Tax Buoyancy = f (Institutions) 
Here variable institutions cover various characteristics i.e. Regulatory Quality, Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Voice & Accountability, Control of Corruption, Democracy and 
Autocracy. Previously tax buoyancy has been studied by researchers (Leuthold & N'Guessan; 
1986) w.r.t. the growth of national income of the nations but no such attempt has been made to 
incorporate these institutional factors which actually inculcate the tax culture in societies. Hence 
considering those factors one of the most responsible reasons for low taxation in developing 
nations, this study formulate these three empirical models; 
(Direct Taxes) i,t = α0 + β1 (Institutions)i,t + εi,t 
(Indirect Taxes) i,t = α0 + β1(Institutions)i,t + εi,t 
(Total Revenue) i,t = α0 + β1 (institutions)i,t + εi,t 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique has been used for knowing the tax 
buoyancy with respect to institutional parameters. It is considered that this technique gives very 
consistent estimates for linear regression models. Here α0’ s are the constant terms while β1;s are 
the parameters to be estimated. εi,t are the error terms of which average is assumed to be zero. 
Each Model will be estimated for two regimes i.e. autocratic and democratic regime. Moreover 
to check whether the data contains either country specific or time specific effects F-Test has 
been applied. The basic purpose behind using it to make the choice between pooled OLS and 
fixed effect models in case of panel data. Its null hypothesis states that individual specific 
effects are not present and If H0 is rejected under the F-test, then it means fixed effects are 
present in economic series and better is not to apply pooled OLS technique because estimates 
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become biased in this way. Same procedures have been done for the analysis of data in this 
study too and F-Test supported pooled OLS estimation technique concluding that fixed effects 
are not present in these economic series.  
4.2: Definition of Variables and Data Sources: 
Panel data has been used for regression analysis of 50 developing countries for the time period 
from 1996 to 2013. Among the explanatory variables institutional variables such as Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Control of 
Corruption, Institutional autocracy and Democracy capture the role of quality of institutions. 
Data on these factors are taken from World Governance Indicator (WGI) and for measuring the 
extent of democracy and autocracy in political regimes, Data set of Political Institutions (DPI) is 
being used. Dependent variables being used in the study to observe the bouyoncy of taxes are 
Overall Tax Revenue, Direct tax (income tax), Indirect tax (sales tax). These are being extrscted 
from international financial Statistic (IFS). 
5: Estimation of Results 
To start the estimation procedure, first step is to know about the descriptive analysis of the 
dataset. Table 1.1 illustrates the summary statistics of all variables being used in the study. Such 
analysis helps in knowing whether the data being used in the study is balance, normality 
condition is getting fulfilled or detection of outliers in the the collected observations.  
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics with indirect taxes 
Variables Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum Observations 
Indirect Tax 11.4824 9.81027 -1.3 25.5 900 
Direct Tax 21.93 10.627 9.9764 53 900 
Total Tax 27.51079 12.79605 5.5 51.4 900 
Government 
Effectiveness 
.1925943 1.112527 -2.45 2.26 900 
Ragulatory 
Quality 
.2940121 1.073143 -2.53 2.12 900 
Rule of Law .0993967 .9855328 -2.11 1.96 900 
Voice & 
Accountability 
.1038311 1.090093 -2.28 4.08 900 
Control of 
Corruption  
-.2386275 1.017533 -3 2.46 900 
Democracy 7.776772 3.356232 0 10 900 
Autocracy  1.061934 2.396562 0 9 900 
 
5.1 Estimation Results Direct Taxes  
Now proceeding a step ahead, In this section the Baseline Model is being applied using Direct 
Taxes. For this purpose two models have been estimated using two political regime effects i.e. 
democracy and autocracy separately. This has been processed by applying  OLS regression 
method for this equation: 
DTi,t = α0 + β institutionsi,t + εi,t 
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Where Direct Taxes are taken as income tax for country i collected in time period t. This 
variable has been regressed against various factors describing the quality of institutional 
infrastructure under both regimes.  Results are given below in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2: Dependent variable: Direct tax (income tax) 
Variables Model 1 Model2 
Constant 9.8308*** 
(0.000) 
23.2585*** 
(0.000) 
Government  
effectiveness 
-.4379 
(0.249) 
-.1683 
(0.691) 
Regulatory quality -.4667 
(0.278) 
-.8768* 
(0.068) 
Rule of law . -1.8719*** 
(0.000) 
-2.0520*** 
(0.000) 
Voice and Accountability .8746** 
(0.016) 
1.2415* 
(0.002) 
Control of Corruption -1.2205* 
(0.001) 
-.7313* 
(0.077) 
Democracy 1.5600*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Autocracy - -1.0728*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 900 900 
Countries 50 50 
Sample period 1996-2013 1996-2013 
R square 0.27 0.10 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% respectively. P-values are in 
the parentheses. 
From the Table 1.2, it can be seen that two models have been run to evaluate the impact political 
regimes and their institutional structures on the tax collection in these developing nations. 
Results show that democracies and their institutional features are affecting more positively to 
the direct tax revenues as compared to autocracies confirming to the findings of Glaeser (2004) 
that autocratic regimes consume a bigger amount of resources but the direction is totally 
devoted to political supporters. So autocracy shows a negative tendency towards direct tax 
collection. Except voice and accountability, all other governance related factors are negatively 
affecting this tax collection in these nations and the intensity of being negative in relationship 
gets more in case of autocracies. It means that autocray is appearing as one of the prominent 
causes for the collapse of policies and rules. Government effectiveness in both cases is showing 
no impact on the tax collection for developing nations which is proving that in these nations 
political systems does not have this much credibility and this is the reason that citizens remain 
reluctant in paying taxes and showing cooperation with their governments. Regulatory quality is 
showing negative but insignificant impact on direct taxes in case of developing nations but it 
becomes significant in case of autocracies showing that autocratic ruler has more authority in 
regulating the system as compared to a ruler of democracies. And this is also one of the reason 
that at the initial stages of development, autocracy is being advised as a good choice for 
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developing nations. Rule of law is showing negative and significant impact on direct tax in both 
cases. This is because of the reason that frequent, unpredictable and non- transparent changes in 
law, are quite in practice to benefit influential groups in these nations. All this makes nature of 
relationship negative.  Accountability leads to more tax collection but in absence of 
accountability, public officials use their position for private interest and do open corruption. 
Mysterious decision making in government is very common in these developing nations. And 
this is why that this variable is showing inverse relationship with tax collection in this panel. 
Value of R square is showing that 27% variation in dependent variable is due to democracy and 
its related institutional features while only 10 % these factors are contributing in tax collection 
to GDP for autocracy regime.   
5.2 Estimation With Indirect Taxes:  
Here the same process has been done but after incorporating indirect tax in the equation given 
above. Using the same methodology and proposed variables, the results are given below in 
Table 1.3.  
Table 1.3: Dependent variable: Indirect tax (Sales tax) 
Variables Model 1 Model2 
Constant -2.769*** 
(0.001) 
12.5540*** 
(0.000) 
Government  
effectiveness 
-.4183 
(0.196) 
-.1517 
(0.690) 
Regulatory quality .5127 
(0.162) 
.1181 
(0.784) 
Rule of law -1.3701*** 
(0.000) 
-1.5690*** 
(0.000) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
.9556*** 
(0.002) 
1.3971*** 
(0.000) 
Control of Corruption -2.0868*** 
(0.000) 
-1.6074*** 
(0.000) 
Democracy 1.7642*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Autocracy - -1.3802*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 900 900 
Countries 50 50 
Sample period 1996-2013 1996-2013 
R square 0.3848 0.1466 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% respectively. P-values are in 
the parentheses. 
Here the same exercise has been done for taking indirect taxes as dependent variable. Again two 
models are being run i.e. one for democracy and the other for autocracy. R- Square of both 
models shows improvement in its value and this confirms the perception about developing 
nations that these have more reliance on indirect taxes. All the signs of variables are in the same 
direction as in the case of Models for Direct Taxes. And again the impact of democracy and its 
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institutional indicators are affecting more to the tax collection as compared to autocracy.  F 
statistics are highly significant in both cases which depicts the overall goodfit of the model.   
5.3 Overall Tax Revenue:  
After evaluating the impact of various institutional factors separately on the tax collection from 
direct and indirect taxes , now here the same effect of institutional framework has been tried to 
analyze for overall Tax revenue.  
Table 1.4: Dependent Variable= Overall Tax Revenue 
Variables Model 1 Model2 
Constant 8.3095*** 
(0.000) 
13.7405*** 
(0.000) 
Government 
effectiveness 
1.0509*** 
(0.000) 
1.1244*** 
(0.000) 
Regulatory quality -.5028 
(0.182) 
-.5526** 
(0.060) 
Rule of law . 1.3071*** 
(0.000) 
1.4080*** 
(0.000) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
-.4001 
(0.101) 
-.3306 
(0.184) 
Control of Corruption 1.2079*** 
(0.000) 
1.4595*** 
(0.000) 
Indirect tax .8516*** 
(0.000) 
.9336*** 
(0.000) 
Direct tax .1503*** 
(0.000) 
.1842*** 
(0.000) 
Democracy .8039*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Autocracy - -.7472*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 900 900 
Countries 50 50 
Sample period 1996-2013 1996-2013 
R square 0.785 0.248 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% respectively. P-values are in 
the parentheses. 
In this Table not only the effect of both political regimes and their institutional setups have been 
evaluated for overall tax revenue collection but also whether tax system is regressive or 
progressive in nature for both type of developing nations. Findings proved that in both types of 
regimes for these set of developing nations, the role of indirect taxes is more prominent than 
direct taxes confirming that tax system is regressive in these nations. But discussing 
individually these taxes in both Models then we see that in autocratic regimes the coefficient 
becomes large as compared to democracy (showing autocracies more regressive in nature). Here 
one more very visible change can be seen that in case of overall taxation, the impact of 
government effectiveness and control of corruption becomes positive.  R-square of both models 
explain that it is democracy in which economic systems can collect more revenues through taxes 
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relative to autocracies. In democracy taxpaying individuals directly participate in political 
process by having a right to vote because due to more accountability and transparency it 
encourages tax payer’s confidence and decrease tax evasion level (Torgler, 2003; Torgler, 
Schaltegger, & Schaffner, 2003). Hence, it contributes to more progressive policies such as 
public goods transfer along with rich poor nexus (Tonizzo, 2008).  Moreover share of direct 
taxes are 85 % while indirect taxes contribute only 15% in overall tax collection. It is evidence 
from massive literature that direct taxes contribute very little to tax collection in developing 
countries. This is due to lack of tax administration and complexities in tax system. All other 
variables are highly significant at 1% level of significance. Value of R square is 0.785 in model 
of democracy which shows that all these variables are explaining about 79% variation in 
dependent variable collectively. F statistics is highly significant. value which depicts that model 
is overall a good fit. In model 2 we regress overall tax revenue with same explanatory variables 
but for autocratic regimes then the results show the same trend as in case of model 1. In both 
models, impact of government effectiveness is significant and has positive impact on tax 
revenue. Accountability and regulatory quality is again showing negative impact on overall 
taxes in case of these nations. It is clear from Table 1.4 that regulatory quality is significant with 
5% level of significance however, voice and accountability is insignificant due to above 
mentioned reasons. Rule of law, control of corruption, direct tax, indirect tax and autocracy all 
are significant at 1%. Moreover it can be seen that autocracy is contributing only 74% whereas 
democratic regime contributes 80%. So it is can be concluded on the basis of these results that 
in institutional features of democracies are more conducive for revenue generation from tax than 
autocratic natured institutional setups. Again F- statistics is highly significant which shows 
overall goodness of fit. Value of R square is again 24% here showing that only 24% variation in 
total tax revenue is explained by explanatory variables. Rule of law is contributing more than 
any other explanatory variable so it is concluded that if proper attention is being diverted in 
improving justice and court systems for accountability then fear of punishment can bring more 
and more people into tax nets in these nations.   
6: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
From the results of the study it is evident that institutions are acting as a backbone of any 
society. A comprehensive social and economic development is based on institutional 
development and efficient and competitive tax system. Taxes also play a vital and significant 
role in economic development. The revenues collected through different taxes help in improving 
the pace of development in nations. So if tax administration is not serving efficiently in 
economies then it means that there must exist some loophole in roadmap of the system. This 
study fetches these two strands of the literature and make an effort to see either they both have 
some significant impact on each other or not by employing Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
technique for 50 cross sections from the time period 1996-2013. Motivation of study is to 
address lack of tax administration and institutional inefficiencies in these nations. Proxies of tax 
buoyancy are direct taxes, indirect taxes and total tax revenue. We use income tax as direct tax 
while sales tax for indirect taxes. Total tax revenue is selected as percentage of GDP. 
Institutional proxies contain political and governance variables such as governance 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, control of corruption, 
institutional autocracy and democracy. Results shows that in democratic political systems, 
institutional factors are contributing positively to the tax collection while in autocratic regimes, 
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these are affecting negatively tax revenue generation. However all these features are 
contributing negatively to the tax collection of these nations. This confirms the first hypothesis 
of the study that institutional frameworks of different political systems matter in collecting taxes 
from economic system.  Moreover contribution of Indirect tax in total tax collection is more as 
compared to direct taxes in the model specification with total tax collection. These findings 
confirm that the tax system of these nations is regressive in nature confirming the second 
hypothesis of the study. On the basis of these findings, it is recommended to the policy makers 
that to increase the revenues better is to focus on the institutional reforms in society. These 
reforms ultimately bring cultural change in the mindsets of people due to better governance and 
improved rule of law. Citizens in this way will feel more protected and sure about where their 
money is going because better governance will lead to more accountability of every person 
belonging to the system. Less feared and more protected citizens will contribute positively in 
the building of society. Moreover it has been observed that democratic systems are having more 
accountability and court systems as compared to autocratic regimes therefore developing 
countries should try to reform gradually their systems i.e. transformation from autocratic nature 
to democratic governments.  
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Sample of Developing nations used in the study 
Autocratic Nations Democratic Nations 
China Bulgaria 
Colombia Chile 
Egypt Costa Rica 
Ethiopia Ecuador 
Guatemala India 
Iran Indonesia 
Jordan Latvia 
Kazakhstan Madagascar 
Kenya Malawi 
Korea Malaysia 
Kirgizstan Mauritius 
Morocco Mexico 
Nepal Mongolia 
Oman Panama 
Pakistan Peru 
Qatar Philippine 
Russia Poland 
Saudi Arabia Romania 
Tunisia Senegal 
Yemen Singapore 
Armenia South Africa 
Azerbaijan Srilanka 
Cameroon Thailand 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Turkey 
 
Ukraine 
 
Venezuela 
 
